Case Study · Power Outage · 2019
October 2019. Pacific Gas & Electric intentionally cut power to 2 million California customers while four wildfires were already burning simultaneously in the state. Not a blackout from a storm. Not a grid failure. A deliberate utility decision made to prevent their infrastructure from igniting fires. Power shutoffs for wildfire prevention are now a permanent feature of life in fire-prone regions — and they require different preparation than anything that's come before.
California · October–November 2019
The context for understanding California's Public Safety Power Shutoff program is the 2018 Camp Fire — the deadliest wildfire in California history, which killed 85 people and destroyed the town of Paradise. The Camp Fire was caused by Pacific Gas & Electric transmission equipment that failed during high-wind conditions. The resulting liability contributed to PG&E's January 2019 bankruptcy filing. And it established the core logic of PSPS: utility infrastructure — when energized during extreme wind events — can become a wildfire ignition source. De-energizing that infrastructure during extreme wind events eliminates one of the most dangerous ignition pathways in fire-prone regions.
The October 2019 PSPS events were the largest the program has yet produced. The PSE Healthy Energy analysis documents the scale: "more than 2 million customers (1.7 million in PG&E territory) experienced PSPS outages" during October 2019, during which "multiple wildfires already raged (Caples in El Dorado, Kincade in Sonoma County, Saddle Ridge, and Tick in Los Angeles) and the preceding hot dry conditions that helped ignite and spread them continued." Weather reports predicted winds exceeding 80 mph. PG&E officials subsequently attested that the 2019 shutoffs helped prevent up to 56 wildfires. The CPUC authorized the shutoffs. The CPUC also later found that all three major California utilities had failed to comply with required notification and communication guidelines in many of their 2019 PSPS events — fining them and requiring corrective actions. The tool was legitimate. The implementation was flawed.
Oct–Nov 2019
Peak Events
2 million
Customers Affected
Intentional
Type of Outage
56 fires
Claimed Prevented
Permanent
Policy Status
The PSPS program represents something genuinely new in the U.S. power outage record: a category of planned, utility-initiated power interruption triggered not by grid failure, storm damage, or system overload, but by weather-based risk management. The CPUC website's description of the program is direct: "This allows the electric IOUs (San Diego Gas & Electric, Pacific Gas and Electric, Southern California Edison, Liberty Utilities, Bear Valley Electric Service, and PacifiCorp) to shut off power to prevent catastrophic wildfires when strong winds, heat events, and related conditions are present." For the approximately 10 million Californians who live in utility-designated Tier 2 and Tier 3 high fire threat districts, PSPS is not a hypothetical. It is a recurring feature of fall and winter in a California that is both drier and more fire-prone than in prior decades. The PSE Healthy Energy analysis documents that since 2018, the average has been 14 PSPS events per year — with more than 1 million customers impacted per year on average.
The Science
Think of high-voltage transmission and distribution lines as systems that can fail in fire-igniting ways during extreme wind events. The primary failure modes: (1) Conductor-to-vegetation contact — high winds cause power lines to contact vegetation, generating arcs that ignite dry plant material. (2) Conductor-to-conductor contact — lines that normally maintain safe separation are pushed together by high winds, generating arcs. (3) Equipment failure — wind stress on aging conductors, splices, clamps, or insulators causes equipment failure that generates sparks. (4) Downed lines — extreme winds cause lines to fall on dry vegetation. All of these failure modes require the line to be energized to cause ignition. De-energization prevents all of them, at the cost of the power supply for the duration. The 2018 Camp Fire was caused by a 100-year-old transmission tower that failed during high winds when the line was energized. If PSPS had been in effect for that specific line that morning, 85 people would not have died and Paradise would not have burned.
PSPS differs fundamentally from storm-triggered or equipment-failure-triggered outages because it is implemented based on weather forecasts rather than on actual failure events. Utilities receive meteorological forecasts of wind speeds, humidity, temperature, and fire weather indexes from specialized systems, assess the risk level for each portion of their grid, and decide whether to de-energize before the weather event rather than during or after it. This means PSPS shutoffs can begin days before the extreme weather arrives — and the PG&E notification requirement specifies that utility systems should alert customers as early as possible, with multiple notifications via phone, text, and email. The advance notice available from PSPS is the key advantage it provides for household preparedness: unlike a storm outage that arrives with the storm, a PSPS can be planned for. If you receive a PSPS alert for your area, you have time to charge devices, fill the car with gas, pick up medications, and make ice before the power goes off.
PSPS events in California are concentrated in the fall — from September through December — when the combination of dry vegetation from the summer fire season, strong diablo and Santa Ana winds, and low humidity creates the conditions that drive fire weather. The PSE Healthy Energy analysis of California PSPS events shows that October and November are the peak months. This predictability is itself a preparedness asset: households in Tier 2 and Tier 3 high fire threat districts can prepare PSPS kits specifically for fall — fully charged batteries, food and water for 2–5 days, ice in the freezer, critical medications stocked, and backup power for any medical devices — during September each year, before the PSPS season begins.
Timeline
01
November 8, 2018: Camp Fire starts near Paradise, California. Origin: PG&E transmission tower that failed during high winds. 85 people killed. Town of Paradise destroyed. California's deadliest wildfire. PG&E faces liability estimated in billions; files for bankruptcy in January 2019. The case for PSPS becomes undeniable: utility infrastructure that caused this disaster was energized during conditions where de-energization would have prevented ignition.
02
2018–2019: CPUC authorizes and begins regulating PSPS events. By 2018, utilities serving 82% of California customers are reporting PSPS events. SDG&E had been doing PSPS since 2012. PG&E and SCE begin larger scale implementation. The regulatory framework evolves — notification requirements, duration limits, customer support services, and coordination with local emergency management. The program is real, authorized, and growing.
03
October 2019: Largest PSPS event in program history. Four wildfires already burning simultaneously (Caples, Kincade, Saddle Ridge, Tick). Winds forecast to exceed 80 mph. PG&E cuts power to 1.7 million customers. Total across utilities: >2 million. Duration: days. Hospitals on backup power, traffic signals out, schools closed, businesses shut. PG&E later attests: prevented up to 56 wildfires. CPUC later finds: utilities failed to comply with required notification guidelines in many events.
04
2020–present: PSPS becomes a permanent annual feature. Average ~14 events per year in California since 2018. Average >1 million customers impacted per year. CPUC drives utilities to improve notifications, reduce durations, and accelerate grid hardening to reduce future PSPS need. Utilities required to provide community resource centers, medical baseline customer support, and proactive communication. PSPS is a permanent feature of fire-season preparedness for 10+ million Californians.
Human Decisions
The trade-off PSPS represents
PSPS is a policy that accepts a certain, significant harm — planned power outage affecting millions — to prevent a potential, catastrophic harm — utility-ignited wildfire killing dozens and destroying thousands of homes. The 2018 Camp Fire's 85 deaths and the destruction of Paradise provide the reference point for what the catastrophic harm looks like when the prevention fails. The PSPS trade-off is genuinely difficult for the households who lose power, experience food spoilage, miss work, and face medical device challenges. But in the context of California's fire history, utility-ignited wildfires have been among the state's deadliest disasters. The PSPS policy accepts the distributed inconvenience of many outages to prevent the concentrated catastrophe of utility-caused fires.
All other power outages covered in this series — grid failure, storm damage, infrastructure collapse — are unplanned. PSPS is planned. The utility will announce it before it happens. This changes the preparedness calculus completely: PSPS preparation can be done before the outage begins, with accurate advance notice. Charging devices, purchasing ice, preparing food, picking up medications, refueling the car — all of these can be done in the hours or days before a PSPS begins. Households that recognize PSPS as a recurring, forecastable, and preventable-for category of outage can reduce their disruption significantly compared to households that treat it like a surprise storm outage.
The gaps the 2019 events exposed
The CPUC found that all three major utilities had failed to comply with required notification guidelines in many of their 2019 PSPS events. Customers who should have received advance notice didn't get it, or received it too late to prepare. Local government officials weren't consistently notified in time to coordinate community resources. Medical baseline customers who depend on power for life-sustaining equipment didn't always receive adequate support. The CPUC required corrective actions and imposed financial penalties. The notification failures are now a documented gap that utilities must address — and that households can partially compensate for by proactively monitoring PSPS forecasts themselves rather than waiting for utility notifications.
PSPS creates the same medical device challenge as any extended outage — oxygen concentrators without power, insulin without refrigeration, dialysis without electricity — with the critical difference that PSPS is planned in advance. Puerto Rico's residents had no warning that their grid was about to fail for 11 months. California residents in PSPS zones have advance warning — sometimes days — and the opportunity to prepare. Utilities are required to provide specific support for medical baseline customers during PSPS events. The failure to prepare for PSPS's medical device impact is less forgivable than the failure to prepare for Hurricane Maria, because the timing is forecast.
The cascade lesson
California's Public Safety Power Shutoff program created a genuinely new type of power outage in the United States. Not a storm outage. Not a grid failure. Not a cascade failure. A utility decision, made in advance, based on weather forecasts, to de-energize lines before they can ignite wildfires. For the 10+ million Californians in high fire-threat zones, PSPS is now a recurring annual feature — approximately 14 events per year on average, concentrated in fall. The difference between PSPS and every other type of power outage is advance notice: you will know it's coming. That advance notice is the key to effective PSPS preparedness. Households that treat PSPS as a forecastable recurring event — preparing their PSPS kit every September, monitoring utility alerts during fall, and executing a standard preparation routine when a PSPS is announced — will experience PSPS events as manageable disruptions. Households that treat each PSPS as a surprise will continue to be caught unprepared by an event that is, by design, not supposed to be surprising.
What You Can Do Now
PSPS preparedness is different from all other power outage preparedness because it can be done in advance with reliable lead time. These five actions are specific to making a forecastable planned outage into a manageable disruption.
Your PSPS risk is determined by your location in the utility's grid — specifically whether you are in a Tier 2 (elevated wildfire risk) or Tier 3 (extreme wildfire risk) district as designated by the CPUC. The CPUC maintains a publicly accessible map. If you are in a Tier 2 or Tier 3 district, PSPS events are a forecastable recurring feature of your fall and winter. If you are not in a high fire-threat district, your risk of PSPS is substantially lower — though other regions of the U.S. may develop similar programs as wildfire risk expands.
Wildfire and PSPS risk guidePSPS events are concentrated in the October–December window. Every September, run a standard preparation check: test your backup battery systems, rotate food and water supplies to ensure freshness, restock medications, confirm your generator has fuel (and test it), and update your communication contacts list. The 2019 events caught many households unprepared because they treated PSPS as a surprise. PSPS is not a surprise. It is a recurring seasonal event with a predictable calendar window.
Seasonal preparedness calendarWhen you receive a PSPS notification, your action window begins immediately. Charge all phones, laptops, and battery packs to 100%. Make ice and fill the freezer's empty spaces with water bottles (thermal mass slows warming). Fill the car with gas (gas stations don't work without power). Pick up any prescriptions that are running low. Move temperature-sensitive medications to the refrigerator's coldest zone with ice. The few hours between notification and de-energization are the most valuable time in PSPS preparedness. Use them.
PSPS immediate action guideCalifornia utilities are required to provide specific support for Medical Baseline customers during PSPS events — including priority notifications, community resource centers with charging stations, and in some cases generator access. Register for your utility's Medical Baseline program if you have life-sustaining equipment. In addition, develop a specific PSPS plan for each device: what is the battery life, what is the backup power option, and what is the action plan if PSPS lasts longer than the backup power capacity?
Medical device PSPS planning guideRooftop solar with battery storage provides PSPS independence for critical loads — refrigerator, medical devices, lighting, phone charging — because it operates independently of the utility grid during an outage. In California's high fire-threat zones, the combination of PSPS frequency and available solar resources makes this investment case unusually strong. The upfront cost is significant, but the cost of recurring PSPS impacts — food spoilage, work disruption, medical device management — is also significant over years of annual events.
Long-term resilience investmentsPower outage case study series
The 2003 Northeast Blackout covers cascading grid failure. Puerto Rico 2017 covers the longest US blackout. NYC 1977 covers social breakdown. The 2012 India Blackout covers the largest outage in history. Together, they document every major power outage failure mode — including the new one.
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